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Abstract 
 
This study examines the pricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) and the long-term performance 
of the IPOs on the Nordic market. Therefore, the study focuses in particular on the impact of the 
ownership, the pricing and long-term performance of IPOs. There are a number of reasons for a 
company to go public, such as acquiring equity to finance growth, to create liquidity, or to realize 
all or part of the owners’ current holdings. The last mentioned is a common reason for private 
equity (PE) companies to exit their portfolio companies. Private equity investment stands for a 
situation where a PE-company invests capital to the target company in return for a stake of the 
company. Private equity can be roughly divided into two parts. Buyout investors invest in a 
majority stake or buy an entire company, after which they begin to develop the company to 
make it more valuable, while minority investors invest in a minority stake to finance early stage 
growth and offer their own expertise to the growing the company and helping them to create 
contacts among the business world. 
 
This study examines 236 new IPOs during 2005-2016, which have been divided into private 
equity-backed and non-sponsored companies at the time of listing. The reason why the Nordic 
market is currently a very interesting market is the significant increase of private equity 
investments in the recent years. For this reason, this study will increase the understanding of 
the Nordic IPO market and the impact of private equity investors on a company’s pricing and 
long-term performance. The IPOs performance have been compared to the MSCI Nordic Index.  
 
The results show that new IPOs are underpriced during the first trading day, which is consistent 
with IPOs in other similar developed markets. There are many reasons for underpricing, such as 
asymmetrical information, behavioral factors and attracting new investors. The results also 
show evidence of higher underpricing during hot periods compared to other periods. In the long-
term, buyout-backed IPOs performed significantly better on average than other companies using 
the BHAR method and F-test. On the other hand, venture capitalist-backed IPOs are the only 
group which performed poorly, leading to significant underperformance in the long-term. 
Furthermore, buyout- and non-sponsored IPOs outperformed compared to the benchmark 
index in the long-term. Similar findings of buyout-backed IPOs’ long-term success have been 
reported in previous studies and the same pattern applies in the Nordic level. 
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1. Introduction 
Going public is one of the most important decisions a company can make during its life 
cycle. In short, this means that the company offers shares for the first time to other 
investors on the public stock exchange. There are many reasons why companies want 
to go public, such as raising equity capital from investors to grow their business or to 
expand to new markets, to create liquidity or to increase the investor base. For 
investors, especially institutional investors, the benefit of an initial public offering (IPO) 
is that they can build a sizeable position in a stock that can be expensive in the secondary 
market. In addition, IPOs are often subject to discounts, which make them attractive 
compared to listed peers and may lead to better returns. Listing is also a way for current 
owners who have invested in the early stages of the company to make a full or partial 
exit to repatriate their profits. (Espinasse 2014: 1; Helwege & Liang 2004.) 
 
Early stage companies are usually in a need of financing in order to innovate new 
products or services. These companies are usually young and may not have a stable cash 
flow or needs financing for marketing purposes or for expansion into new markets. This 
can lead to difficulties in accessing financing alternatives, for instance loans or the 
owner’s savings. The difficulties relate to, among other things, companies potentially 
high values, uncertainty, the quality of the companies’ assets and the current status on 
the relevant market. (Basha & Walz 2001.) 
 
The lack of stable cash flow, which can lead to difficulties in maintaining growth while 
meeting the financial institutions' fixed instalments are a challenge to owners wanting 
to expand their business further while the operating and financial costs are high. The 
solution is often to seek capital from the private equity industry. During the last decades, 
venture capital and private equity have become a growing source of company financing. 
This type of financing results in higher economic growth. Some of the world's fastest 
growing companies, including Amazon, Apple, Google and Facebook have all enjoyed 
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the benefits of venture capital in their early growth stages. (Demaria: 9; Gompers 2007: 
483; NVCA  2015.) 
 
The private equity (PE) industry has become a key player in the global financial markets 
over the last decades, especially in the early stages of financing growth companies and 
startups. The private equity industry plays a major role in the mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) market, provides capital to companies and also serves an important role in 
publicizing companies through IPOs. (Cendrowski, Martin, Petro & Wadecki 2013: 3-5, 
69-71.) In addition, the industry enjoys popularity, especially among young finance or 
operational excellence employees, making it possible for private equity companies to 
recruit top talents. Studying the impacts of the private equity industry is a current 
research topic, especially as interest rates today are at record low and investment funds 
are full of dry powder trying to seek potential investments. 
 
The target for the private equity investors is simply to gain value and to gain high returns 
through the value creation and further the listing process. Private equity investors seek 
for companies where they see growth or turnaround potential and develop them during 
their hold period, trusting that they can sell the company with higher valuation in the 
divestment process. During the hold period, highly skilled private equity managers 
develop and optimize the portfolio company’s operational processes, gives muscles to 
grow with the capital they provide and through experienced management drives the 
company with a new strategy towards the goals. The value creation is often called a 
hands on approach, which means that the owners are involved widely in the 
development and life of the portfolio company. (Jensen 1986; Levis 2011; Demaria 2013: 
239-240.) 
 
When market conditions are favorable for higher valuations, the number of IPOs also 
increases. The above-mentioned phenomena can be called as a hot IPO market when 
listing activity is high and the investor sentiment are more optimistic regarding the 
future performance and the underwriter’s valuation of the company. The IPO cycles 
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come in waves when hot periods are taking place during times of bullish market and cold 
periods during times of bearish market. The timing of the listing is important to attract 
investors to attend in the listing to make it possible for the listing to be successful, 
especially for private equity investors to maintain good track record. Moreover, the 
current owners achieve significant returns for the first time as a result of developing the 
company for many years. Therefore, it is important to make the issue in times when 
owners are willing to divest the company for the valuation they would like to get. 
(Helwege & Liang 2004; Ibbotson & Jaffe 1975.) 
 
The IPO market has been hot due to various new issues in the recent years, and the 
Nordic private equity market has achieved capital more than ever and the investment 
volumes for growth companies and startups are record high. Due to the low interest 
rates and the dry powder that big funds try to invest in order to achieve positive returns 
in challenging market conditions, this study is relevant for the time to understand the 
characteristics of an IPO and to examine the aftermarket performance of IPOs in the 
Nordic market.  
 
 
1.1 Purpose of the study 
The aim of the study is to determine whether IPOs sponsored by the private equity 
industry perform better than the non-sponsored companies, and how the new listed 
companies perform against the benchmark index. In addition, this study aims to explain 
reasons for IPO underpricing anomaly. Previous studies offer many different 
explanations for why IPOs are underpriced. This study examines Nordic IPOs during 
2005-2016 and investigates whether there are underpricing between different market 
cycles and the performance of the new IPOs against the benchmark. Furthermore, this 
research provides information on underpricing and long-term performance between 
sponsor-backed and non-sponsored IPOs.  
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Most of the private equity-backed IPO studies are focusing on the US and UK markets, 
which are the main markets in the private equity industry. That makes it interesting to 
see how the Nordic markets behaves correspondingly. Moreover, the investment 
volumes in the Nordic countries have increased significantly in recent decades to 
support the growth of early stage companies. (Westerholm 2006; FVCA 2018a, 2018b.) 
 
 
1.2 Hypotheses 
The hypotheses have been formed based on the theory of the IPOs and the aftermarket 
performance. There are many theories trying to explain these phenomena’s, but the 
current state is far from unanimous in all aspects. In this study, the hypotheses 
supported in previous studies are implemented into the Nordic markets in order to study 
whether the same characteristics holds. Hypotheses covers all aspects from IPO’s first-
day underpricing to long-term performance and the difference between the pre-listing 
ownership, which might be interesting for investors operating in the Nordic markets.  
 
The first hypothesis relates to initial public offerings (IPOs) and a well-documented 
phenomenon of the first-day underpricing. Many theories are proposed to explain the 
phenomenon but the academical consensus is still rather mixed. (Ibbotson 1975; Ritter 
& Welch 2002.) The first hypothesis is presented as follows: 
 
𝐻1:  New IPOs tend to be underpriced during the first trading day when companies going 
public.  
 
The hot and cold market theory was presented at the first time by Ibbotson and Jaffe 
(1975). The hot market can be defined when IPO volumes are high, and IPOs are over 
subscripted. The other view relates to companies which tend to use over optimistic 
investor sentiment during the hot markets. Based on the above-mentioned hypothesis 
the second hypothesis is presented as follows: 
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𝐻2:  During the hot period, the first-day underpricing returns are higher in the Nordic 
markets. 
 
The third hypothesis is based on the theory that the companies going public tend to 
underperform against the benchmark index in the long-term. Similar findings have been 
suggested by Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter (1995), Levis (2011) and Aggarwal and 
Rivoli (1990). Ritter (1991) suggest that investing into the IPOs and holding those for 
three years lead to negative returns compared to benchmarks. The third hypothesis is 
presented as follows: 
 
𝐻3:  Companies going public in Nordics underperform against their listed benchmark in 
the long-term. 
 
Superior performance of the buyout-backed IPOs against the other IPOs have been 
documented in past researches by Cao and Lerner (2009), Holthhausen and Larcker 
(1996) and Levis (2011). The evidence is still rather mixed of the PE-backed and non-
sponsored IPO’s long-term performance. The fourth hypothesis is presented as follows: 
 
𝐻4:  Buyout-backed IPOs experience better long-term performance than venture capital- 
and non-sponsored-backed IPOs. 
 
Purnanandam & Swaminathan (2004) suggest that IPOs are more than 10% underpriced 
due to the fact overvaluation of the listing company compared to industry peer price 
multiples. The overvalued IPOs tend to have high first-day returns but low long-term 
performance. The fifth hypothesis can be presented as follows: 
 
𝐻5:  First-day returns, and the long-term performance have a negative relationship in 
the Nordic market. 
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1.3 Motivation 
The main reason for this thesis is to investigate the strong Nordic private equity market 
as well as the sophisticated Nordic stock markets, which gives a strong incentive for the 
private equity and venture capital companies to divest their portfolio companies 
through IPOs. The Nordic markets have been very favorable to private equity- and 
venture capital companies in recent years. Finnish Venture Capital Association (FVCA) 
identified investment volumes by comparing buyout- and venture capital investments 
between the different European countries in proportion to the respective country's 
GDP.  (FVCA 2018a, 2018b.) 
 
 
Figure 1.  Buyout investments into European growth companies. Buyout  can be 
described, when a private equity company has a majority ownership after the 
investment (FVCA 2018a). 
 
Danish growth companies received on average the largest amount of buyout 
investments between the years 2014 and 2018. In view of the average European 
countries in 2018, Danish companies received three times as much buyout investments 
than average European countries. Other Nordic countries also attracted a large amount 
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of private equity financing, with Swedish companies receiving on average the third 
largest amount, followed by Finnish companies in the fourth place. The Norwegian 
companies, on the other hand, attracted lower private equity than the European 
average. The figure 1 can be summarized as the Nordic region has been very attractive 
for the buyout sector in recent years and no slowdown is visible. (FVCA 2018a.) 
 
 
Figure 2.  Venture capital investments into European startups  (FVCA 2018b). 
 
The above figure is showing the percent of venture capital investments of the country 
GDP between European countries during the years 2014 and 2018. In 2018, Finnish 
startups received on average the largest amount of venture capital financing. In view of 
the European average during this period, Finnish companies received twice as much 
venture capital funding compared to the European average. Companies in the other 
Nordic countries also attracted a large amount of venture capital investments, with 
Danish companies receiving the second largest amount of investments during 2018, 
followed by Swedish companies in the fourth place. The Norwegian companies, as in the 
previous buyout investments table, attracted lower venture capital than the European 
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average in 2018. The both figures show similar pattern that the companies in Nordic 
markets are attracting more capital when comparing to peers in other European 
countries. (FVCA 2018b.) 
 
 
1.4 Structure of the study 
This thesis has been divided into six main chapters to give comprehensive idea of the 
subject. This chapter presents the subject of the initial public offering and why private 
equity industry is a key player in this field. Also, the reason for this study to examine the 
Nordic market is presented under the motivation title in the first chapter. In the 
following chapter, the listing process and the basics of the initial public offerings will be 
presented. In addition, it will be explained why companies and their owners want to list 
their shares on the public exchange. In addition, concepts of private equity and venture 
capital are presented, due to it being important to understand why the private equity 
companies invest money to portfolio companies and take the risk of losing money. The 
third chapter present the previous studies and findings which are used as a reference 
for the results of this study. The fourth chapter explains the data, variables and the 
methodology used in this study for the empirical part. After that, the fifth chapter 
presents the empirical results of the research. In the final chapter, conclusions of the 
research are discussed and ideas for further research are provided as well as the 
limitations of the stydy.  
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2. Theoretical background of IPOs and private equity 
The purpose of this chapter is to combine the main academic literature relating to why 
companies go public and the structure of private equity. In addition, the aim of this 
section is to give an understanding on the factors behind the IPOs underpricing. 
Furthermore, this section presents a brief explanation on private equity and venture 
capital structure, exit channels and the private equity value creation model.  
 
 
2.1 Explanation of Initial public offering 
Ritter and Welch (2002) defined initial public offerings as a situation in which a private 
company establishes itself in public trading by listing on a public stock exchange. There 
are many reasons why companies go public, for instance to raise equity capital or to 
convert shareholders’ current wealth into cash (Ritter & Welch 2002). Going public is a 
big step for a company in their lifecycle and brings publicity over the company. IPO can 
be considered as a pricing method of the company and a way to create liquidity and 
acquiring equity capital. When companies are listed, there are requirements for 
transparency and disclosures for keeping investors informed. The listed company is 
accountable to a large group of investors who will vote with their feet, if the company 
does not perform as expected or the management make bad business decisions.  For 
the investors, the initial public offering can be seen as an opportunity to become an 
owner of the company or with the purpose of trading the company’s shares with the 
idea of making profit. (Ljunqvist 2007: 378; Espinasse 2014: 1.) 
 
The IPO is the most important and prestigious divestment for a company, as it signals 
that the owners of the company have succeeded in their investments or development. 
In the private equity sector, every divestment is a major milestone for a company. For 
each successful investment, it proves easier for private and venture capital companies 
to attract investors and their capital and thereby establish new funds. In addition, the 
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current trend is to invest larger funds with an excellent track record of previous 
investments. (Cendrowski et al. 2013: 23-25, 69-83; Gompers 1996.) 
 
 
2.2 IPO process 
The IPO process includes many phases and require knowledge of the capital markets 
from the current owners as well as good communication between the management and 
the investment bank. The IPO process can vary a lot depending on the market 
environment, but as shown in figure 3, the estimate of the IPO timetable is set to last 
for approximately 6 to 9 months, providing everything goes smoothly. However, if the 
listed company is not well prepared (e.g. information-wise) or the market fluctuates a 
lot, the duration of the IPO can easily be much longer. (Espinasse 2014: 77-85.) 
 
When the decision of going public has been done, the process starts with the due 
diligence work with various advisers, who compile all the financials and draft the 
agreements and the prospectus. The due diligence phase takes several months and is 
very detailed and requires a lot of resources from all parties included in the process. 
After the prospectus is almost finished, it will be sent to the market regulator or the 
stock exchange. After receiving approval of the prospectus, the marketing phase starts. 
Fist the management and investment bank present the investment case to the research 
analyst, who makes their initial reports. This is basically done to determine and secure 
the price range of the IPO. In addition, the management and the investment bank can 
take a pre-marketing tour to meet potential institutional investors to discuss the 
investment case. (Espinasse 2014: 77-78.)  
 
After the initial offer price has been determinate, the actual roadshow starts, and the 
investment case is presented to all investors. The offering is often divided in two 
separate parts, the institutional offer and the public offer (in practice individuals). In 
addition, sometimes the personnel are offered a chance to participate in the offering, 
giving them a lower price in order to make the employees motivated and committed to 
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develop the company further. An IPO can be oversubscribed in situations where there 
are more interested investors than there are shares distributable. Correspondingly, an 
IPO can be undersubscribed in situations where the investment case is not getting 
enough interest among investors. If the offer price is way too high or the company 
prospects do not attract investors, the IPO process can be interrupted or put in hold to 
make amendments and come up with ways to make the investment more attractive to 
investors. When all the steps of the IPO process have been completed and the actual 
listing day comes, the company’s shares are traded for the first time on the public 
market. The movement of the share price can be volatile during the first-days or even 
the first weeks, and the fluctuation can be stabilized by one of the participating banks in 
the weeks or months following the listing. (Espinasse 2014: 80-85.) 
 
Figure 3.  IPO timetable (Espinasse 2014: 85). 
 
 
2.3 IPOs underpricing and performance 
The general trend of underpricing new IPOs is a phenomenon which has been observed 
in many previous studies in different markets worldwide (Ritter & Welch 2002; Ibbotson 
1975; Hopp & Dreher 2013; Tinic 1988). Loughran & Ritter (2002) states that when 
companies are going public, they tend to leave a lot of money on the table, resulting in 
the fact that the companies are not raising the maximal amount of equity possible. From 
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another perspective, new shareholders gain returns through underpriced IPOs 
(Loughran & Ritter 2002). Several explanations have been given for underpricing, 
however there is still no consensus on the explanation of this phenomena among 
scholars.   
 
In general, the international evidence regarding IPOs points out remarkably large 
positive returns on the first-day of trading.  On the other hand, the performance of post-
IPO shows significant underperformance against benchmarks. IPOs characteristics, the 
sponsors behind the new listing, market overreaction or different types of information 
asymmetries are often reasons behind positive first-day returns. The long-term 
underperformance is related to times when firms go public and investors are overly 
optimistic about the market or the industry on which such firms are operating. (Levis 
2011.) 
 
The underpricing is calculated as a percentage of the price at which the shares were sold 
to the investors in the time of the IPO ("Offer Price") compared to the price the shares 
subsequently traded on the market. In well-developed capital markets, and without 
restrictions on price fluctuation from day to day, the underpricing appears fairly quickly. 
This is shown by the end of the first trading day at the latest, thus the most studies use 
the first-day closing price to calculate underpricing. In less developed markets or in 
situations where there are restrictions on the price fluctuations, the price stabilization 
may take longer. (Ljungqvist 2007: 381-383.) In this study, underpricing has been 
calculated as the change between the offer price and the first-day closing price, as 
Ljungqvist (2007) suggests. 
 
 
2.3.1 Asymmetric information models 
Asymmetric information refers to a situation where one of the parties holds more 
information than the others in a financial transaction. Many studies see this information 
asymmetry as one of the biggest drivers of IPO underpricing. Asymmetric information 
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can be found in two different stages, between the issuing firm and the investment bank 
that arranges the IPO (“Underwriter”), as well as between different investors. The later 
mentioned exists when some investors have more information than the others. (Katti & 
Phani 2016.) 
 
Rock (1986) presents the Winner’s Curse theory, which has proven to be the best-known 
asymmetric information model explaining the IPO underpricing. Rock assumes that 
some investors are better informed of the true value of the shares in the IPO than other 
investors, the underwriting bank or the issuing firm. Informed investors only take part 
in attractively priced IPOs, while the uninformed participate in all listings without having 
knowledge on which of the listing are particularly attractive. This puts the "winner's 
curse" on uninformed investors. In unattractive offerings, they get all the shares they 
bid for, while in attractive offerings their demand may be displaced by the informed 
investors. In the worst case, the uninformed investors get the full portion of the 
overpriced IPOs, leading to negative average returns, while informed investors gain high 
returns of the profitable IPOs. (Rock 1986.) 
 
According to Baron's (1982) findings, the underwriter of the share issue has more 
information regarding the true value and demand of the company's shares than the 
owners of the company. The greater the uncertainty regarding the correct price and 
demand for a share, the greater the need for the owners to rely on the investment 
bank's pricing expertise. This results in the owners having to let the investment banks to 
set the listing price for the share. The underwriter has an incentive to price the share 
below the real price in order to reduce the marketing effort needed and to avoid the 
overpricing. Underpricing ensures that the investors will trade the share at the offering. 
The more uncertainty on the market regarding the true share price and the demand, the 
greater is the underpricing. The owners of the issuing company give the compensation 
to the underwriter for the information, marketing and arranging the listing. (Baron 
1982.) 
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Baron's hypothesis has been criticized by Muscarella and Vestuypensin (1989), who 
tested the functionality of the Baron model in investment bank listings, where the 
investment bank also acts as an underwriter. Theoretically, underpricing should not 
occur in these IPOs because the investment bank itself sets its own IPO. However, the 
results suggested that the underpricing of investment banks' own IPO is in line with 
other IPOs, which contradicts to Baron's hypothesis. On the other hand, Ritter and 
Welch (2002) suggested that an investment bank might underestimate its own listing as 
a way to improve the corporate image of prospective clients. This is intended to give 
future clients the idea that underpricing is a mandatory cost of the IPO. (Muscarella & 
Vestuypensin 1989; Ritter & Welch 2002.) 
 
 
2.3.2 Market-timing theories 
Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) define hot markets as a period in which the average monthly 
returns on a listed stock is abnormally high. The number of listings is also used as a 
measure in the context of a hot listing market. (Ibbotson & Jaffe 1975.) The supporting 
evidence was found by Loughran and Ritter (2004), who tested hot markets during the 
dot-com bubble and the following period of cold years. They found that during the hot 
period, underpricing was on average over 50% higher compared to the following cold 
period. The main reason behind is that investors tend to be overoptimistic and act 
irrational during hot periods. (Loughran and Ritter 2004.) The fear of missing out is an 
interesting behavior that tend to increase the first-day returns significantly during the 
hot periods. Ritter (1991) states that the volumes of the IPOs varies over time. The high-
volume periods are associated with lower long-term performance, thus indicting that 
the issuer has timed the issue successfully and taken the advantage of the “window of 
opportunity”. (Ritter 1991.) 
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2.3.3 Other explanations 
Tinic (1988) states that one of the institutional explanations for underpricing is to avoid 
a litigation. IPOs could be intentionally underpriced and the underpricing acts as an 
insurance for litigation. Lawsuits requires management time and resources and may 
incur potential high litigation costs for the listing company. In addition, the lawsuits will 
damage reputational image of the company or the investment bank involved in the IPO. 
Moreover, litigation may lead to higher capital costs and can have a detrimental effect 
on applying for financing in the future. (Tinic 1988.)  
 
Hanley, Kumar & Seguin (1993) stated that one institutional explanation for the 
underpricing is the price stabilization provided by the investment bank. Price 
stabilization requires the commitment of the issuing investment bank to keep the stock 
price above the issue price by repurchasing shares as necessary (Hanley et al. 1993). 
Ljungqvist (2007: 405) state that the IPOs are priced to market value, but if the listings 
whose prices are expected to fall below the offer price, the price stabilization can be 
performed in after-market trading. The price stabilization eliminates the negative 
returns and lead to a positive price jump (Ljungqvist 2007: 405). 
 
One of the behavioral factors explaining the underpricing is the investor sentiment. 
Emotional or non-rational investors can be considered to have a strong influence on the 
price of the share, especially in the case of IPOs, as there are no comprehensive historical 
data on the listing companies, and they are difficult to value (Ljungqvist 2007: 414). 
Cornelli, Goldreich & Ljungqvist (2006) found that pre-listing market sentiment is 
strongly positively correlated with first-day returns in the US. In particularly over-
optimistic views of small-scale investors are pushing prices up after the IPO (Cornelli et 
al. 2006). 
 
There are also studies that show the negative aspects of the IPO procedure. This has 
mainly to do with agent problems between the investment bank and the issuing 
company, for example, the investment bank rewards other investors by underpricing 
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IPOs, which means less profits for the issuer. Another example is when the bank gives 
underpriced allocations for example to company managers or certain institutions with 
the hope of winning future transaction mandates. (Ljungqvist 2007: 396-397.) 
 
Dong, Michel and Pandes (2011) suggest that short- and long-term performance is also 
influenced by the reputation of the underwriter in the IPO. The reputation is especially 
influenced by the marketing capabilities of reputable underwriters and price 
stabilization measures. The results support that a good underwriter helps listing 
companies to perform better in the aftermarket. The reputation of the underwriter has 
an even greater impact on long-term performance than on short-term performance, 
based on the findings. (Dong et al. 2011.) 
 
 
2.4 Explanation of private equity 
When a company needs financing for growth or development, there are many different 
options to solve the need, but the most common options are stock exchange or bank 
loans, or in other words equity or debt. Moreover, the stock exchange is a limited 
solution, since it will only provide financing to medium- and large-sized companies that 
meet certain criteria. On the other hand, borrowing conditions for the debt financing 
are also strictly defined. Companies must guarantee their ability to pay back the debt to 
the bank on time, which means that they must demonstrate a certain existence, cash 
flow stability, healthy activity and also a limited indebtedness. If the financing need is 
not funded by the stock exchange or by the banks, the solution is usually the private 
equity. Private equity firms provide financing for the exchange of ownership of the 
target company. (Demaria 2013: 9.) 
 
There are many definitions of private equity, although at the simplest level it can be 
explained as a medium to long-term equity investment that is not traded on the public 
stock exchange. The term “private equity” is used to refer to equity which is not listed 
and not regulated. (Demaria 2013: 9; Cendrowski et al. 2012: 4.) 
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Private equity and venture capital companies are also called as financial sponsors, which 
are investing capital into the portfolio companies. The difference between these two 
types of investments relate to the maturity of the target companies and the ownership 
percentage of the portfolio company. Venture capital refers to equity investments to 
non-public companies in their early stages in order to finance the early development. 
Due to early financing, venture capitalists mostly finance only a minority part or give the 
seed money without change of control of the company. On the contrary, BO-firms 
purchase all or most of a company shares during the transaction by using equity from a 
small group of investors combined with a huge amount of debt. This could also be called 
as a buyout investment (BO). The general belief that the private equity firms use mostly 
debt in acquisitions is partly wrong, as only buyout investments use debt as the main 
element to finance the acquisitions. (Kaplan & Strömberg 2009; Fraser-Sampson 2011: 
7-10.) 
 
According to Jensen (1986, 1989), the operational efficiencies are achieved by 
experienced management, increased leverage and better corporate governance, which 
can be consider as main value drivers in developing the portfolio company. In addition, 
high incentives to private equity company managers lead the portfolio company to 
efficiency and maximum profitability. It is often assumed that such characteristics will 
generally occur during the hold period, but it is also reasonable to assume that the 
management and financial practices adopted at that time will persist after the 
divestment process in listing. This is especially true because private equity companies 
are responsible for the structure, terms and timing of the listing. PE-companies mostly 
retain significant ownership after listing for notable period of time, although the 
ownership decreases in the IPO process. The reasons why PE-companies stay involved 
in the issued company are the lock-up agreements, performance incentives and liquidity 
considerations. This ongoing involvement of the private equity firms facilitates closer 
monitoring and reduces information asymmetry. This can lead to superior aftermarket 
performance. (Levis 2011; Jensen 1986, 1989.) 
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Similar findings were found by Kaplan and Stromberg (2009), who explained the term of 
buyout (BO) as a situation where a private equity company or a fund buys the majority 
ownership of the target company from the previous owners. After the transaction, the 
company will be included in the new owner’s portfolio, leading to changes in the 
company and its management. The capital structure, management incentives and 
corporate governance will similarly go through changes. (Kaplan & Stromberg 2009.)  
 
Private equity investments could be divided in two different types, capital invested in 
funds (fund investment) and capital invested in portfolio companies (direct investment). 
There is a clear line in the PE-industry between the companies who invest in funds and 
those who make the investments into companies. For instance, a pension fund seldom 
invests capital directly into the portfolio companies, although there are some 
exceptions. Instead, pension fund managers tend to focus on their fund investing 
activities to invest capital in private equity funds which act as designated managers 
between the pension fund and the portfolio company. Private equity funds, on the other 
hand, use capital to make direct investments into the portfolio companies. (Cendrowski 
et. al 2012: 5; Kaplan & Strombeg 2009; Fraser-Sampson: 3.) The structure of the PE fund 
is shown below. 
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Figure 4. Private equity fund structure based on Stowell (2013: 319-321) and 
Kaplan & Strömberg (2009). 
 
 
2.5 Private equity value creation 
Private equity companies try to make profit with the investment. The bigger the profit, 
the more pleased are the owners. After the purchase, the private equity firm, or more 
precisely, the general partner, begins to increase the value of the company through 
operations, management as well as through allocating capital to the development. Guo, 
Hotchkiss and Song (2011) tested 192 LBOs during 1990 to 2006 and compared the 
sample to buyout issues which have completed in the 1980s. Guo et al. (2011) state that 
there are some significant changes in the type of more recent issues in terms of that the 
recent buyout issues are priced more conservatively than the companies in the 1980s 
and as well as leverage levels are significantly lower in recent transactions. In addition, 
Guo et al. (2011) found that, on average, the total value of companies increased after 
the buyout. This can be explained that the increase in value is due to the fact that 
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companies are selling of non-performing assets by maximizing the efficiency of the 
remaining assets, rising the value of a company (Guo et al. 2011). Several studies have 
explained that the value creation is based on the better operative performance, which 
is result of better corporate governance, reducing costs, using the capital more 
efficiently or making value-increasing acquisitions (Guo et al. 2011; Kaplan & 
Strömberg 2009; Cotter & Peck 2001; Jensen 1986, 1989). 
 
Sørensen (2007) suggests that the more experienced venture capital companies are, the 
more likely they go public. There are two value creation mechanisms of venture capital 
companies, either through influence or through sorting.  Sørensen (2007) means that 
the added value for a company is inherent in the reputation and experience of venture 
capital firms. Sorting can be defined as a situation where more experienced VCs are 
screening the market, leading to a situation where experienced VCs invest in better 
companies. Influence impact on the other hand can be defined as a situation where the 
venture capital firms’ reputation can provide access to a broader market of clients, 
suppliers and better management than less experienced venture capital firms. More 
experienced venture capital firms are also better to monitor and control their portfolio 
companies. (Sørensen 2007.) 
 
Hsu (2004) shows that the early stage companies would accept the offers of the most 
reputable venture capital firms at the expense of economically more attractive offers. 
This influence allows venture capital firms with more experience and reputation to have 
better companies in their portfolio. The high-reputation VCs acquire future portfolio 
companies at a 10-14% discount and are three times more likely to be accepted. (Hsu 
2004). 
 
 
2.6 Private equity exit strategies 
The exit or divestment is the time during which the private equity company sells its stake 
of the initial investment or the portfolio company, fully or partially. The selling process 
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and the choice of the divestment strategy requires time and judgment in order to 
achieve maximum returns and incentives. Private equity companies have knowledge 
and professionals that tend to successfully exit companies at the right time, which in 
turn leads to high returns. The selling process can be difficult, since the investments are 
normally illiquid and cannot be sold as quickly and easily as the public equity via stock 
exchanges. (Povaly 2006.) 
 
The private equity companies have the power to influence on major decisions in the 
portfolio companies as they usually hold the majority control. In addition, they often 
have the right to influence the divestment strategy to be used in the divestment of the 
portfolio company. After investors have invested capital to fund, the limited partners 
have no rights to say how the capital should deploy the capital. (Kaplan & Strömberg 
2009.) The average holding period in the private equity industry varies between three 
to ten years. Venture capital funds will stay longer as owners than the buyout funds, due 
to early stage investments and start-ups which require more time to grow (XU 2004). 
 
Gompers, Kovner, Lerner and Scharfstein (2008) identified three successful divestment 
types available to private equity and venture capital investments. The first exit strategy 
is a trade sale in which the portfolio company is sold to a strategic buyer, typically a 
competitor or a supplier, with the potential to achieve synergies, e.g. with similar 
products or technology. The second option is a secondary buyout, in which a portfolio 
company is sold to another PE firm. The third successful divestment option is to list the 
company to the public exchange through an IPO process. This is the only divestment 
type where the portfolio company will be publicly traded after the exit. (Gompers et al. 
2008.)  
 
Cumming & MacIntosh (2003) in turn add two different exit channels. Buyback is defined 
as a situation where the management or the entrepreneur buys the company back from 
the PE-firm.  Last alternative is to write-off the initial investment, when the PE-company 
or the VC-fund decide that the investment has no significant upside in the future. 
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According to Cumming & MacIntosh (2003), write-off could be done fully or partially, 
even though they highlight that partial write-off often leads to poor quality remaining in 
the portfolio. (Cumming & MacIntosh 2003.) 
 
Trade sales, buybacks and the secondary buyouts are full exits whereas IPOs are usually 
partial exits, at least for a while. PE-companies sell its ownership in stages due to lock-
up agreements with underwriters, liquidity considerations and performance incentives. 
In addition, IPOs are not as common as trade sales, as the IPO process is costly and time 
consuming. (Levis 2011.) 
 
Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) suggest that the most common exit channel is the trade 
sale to a strategic buyer. Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) studied 17,171 leveraged buyout 
transactions during 1970 to 2007. The trade sale exit occurs in 38 percent of all exits. 
The second most common exit route was a secondary buyout to another private equity 
firm. Initial public offerings, where private equity list the portfolio company was in third 
place by 14 percent of all exits. Moreover, Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) add that private 
equity firms are accused of preferring to “flip” their investment in short-term rather than 
maintaining the ownership for a longer period. The “flip” means that the private equity 
company takes the exit during the first 24 months. In their analysis, Kaplan and 
Strömberg (2009) saw no evidence of flips, instead they found that holding periods have 
increased. (Kaplan & Strömberg 2009.) 
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3. Evidence of previous literature of IPOs underpricing and post-
IPO performance 
This chapter presents relevant literature on the initial issue’s underpricing and long-term 
performance as well as previous research on private equity-backed IPOs which will be 
the reference frame for this thesis. The chapter includes research from Europe and US 
and the rest of the world to provide a view on how different markets behave in terms of 
underpricing and long-term performance.  
 
 
3.1 Previous literature of IPOs underpricing 
Ibbotson (1975) was one of the first people to document the underpricing phenomenon. 
The results showed that average initial performance was positive by 11.4% leading to 
that the new issues are underpriced, although attending to the IPO there is an equal 
chance for gain or loss (Ibbotson 1975). Ljungqvist (2007: 378, 383) states that the 
underpricing before the 20th century was on average close to 20%, differing significantly 
over the decades and adds that during the hot periods, IPOs’ underpricing were much 
higher. For instance, in 2000, the average underpricing was 57% in the US. Ibbotson, 
Sindelar and Ritter (1988) studied the IPOs’ underpricing in the US during 1960-1987 and 
found the average underpricing to be 16.4%. The academic literature is unanimous on 
the fact that the new IPOs are underpriced, but the degree of underpricing depends on 
the timing and the market.  
 
Loughran and Ritter (2002) state that the average IPO left 9.1 million dollars on the table, 
thus the pre-IPO owners are not collecting the maximal potential from the IPOs. The 
total value of the IPOs during 1990 to 1998 was amounting to 27 billion dollars. The 
returns that investors gain during the first-day comes from the company and pre-IPO 
owners pocket. (Loughran & Ritter 2002.) 
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Hopp and Dreher (2013) investigated 29 different markets during the period of 1988 to 
2005 and found that the underpricing differs significantly in different markets and even 
on continents, depending on the market and country characteristics, especially on the 
legal aspect and protection of the investors. The lowest level of underpricing was found 
in New Zealand 6.1% and the highest from India, where it was 96.7%. An interesting 
finding is that in the Nordic countries underpricing is much more moderate compared 
to the other countries in the study. For instance, the underpricing in Finland is as low as 
10.9%, in Denmark the corresponding figure is 9.6% and in Norway 10.1%, whereas in 
Sweden the percentage is 17.4%. This shows that underpricing is highly dependent on 
market characteristics, meaning that the underpricing on similar markets act in the same 
way. This reinforces the view that similar countries can be examined together, meaning 
that the Nordic countries for example can be considered as one market. (Hopp & Dreher 
2013.) 
 
Engelen and van Essen (2010) studied the impact of the country-specific characteristics, 
for instance the impact of legal and institutional framework. The data sample includes 
2920 IPOs in 21 different countries. Engelen and van Essen (2010) suggest that the 
country-specific characteristics explain 10% of the variation in underpricing. The more 
developed the legal framework in the country, the more it reduces the underpricing. 
From this can be concluded that investors are more secured in these countries. (Engelen 
& van Essen 2010.) 
 
Cao and Lerner (2009), found that the buyout-backed companies are bigger and more 
profitable, and the IPOs are arranged by more well-known investment banks. Cao and 
Lerner (2009) adds also that the buyout-backed IPOs were underpriced on average by 
15.4% in the US market. Similar findings were found by Bergström et al. (2006), stating 
that the IPOs which are not backed by PE-companies tend to be more underpriced than 
the others. PE-backed IPOs were underpiced on average by 9.3% and non-sponsored by 
12.9%. The study consists of IPOs from the London and Paris stock exchanges during the 
period of 1994 to 2004 (Bergström et al. 2006). 
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Megginson and Weiss (1991) found that the VC-backed IPOs tend to have significantly 
lower underpricing on the first day due to VC certification, which leads to reduced 
information asymmetry between the issuing company and the investors. In the study, 
the authors tested 320 VC-backed companies in the US market (Megginson & Weiss 
1991). Similar findings to support lower first-day underpricing on VC-backed IPOs was 
found by Brav and Gompers (1997), suggesting that the reputation of the VC is overall 
enough to give the confidence to investors to take part of the IPO, leading to lower 
underpricing (Brav & Gompers 1997).  
 
On the other hand, Francis and Hasan (2001) found that VC-backed IPOs are 
experiencing, on average, higher first-day returns than the non-venture-backed group. 
According to the results, VC-backed IPOs suffer premarket pricing inefficiency, leading 
to higher first-day returns as the offer price has not been at the correct level. (Francis & 
Hasan 2001.)  Similar results were found by Lee and Wahal (2004), who found that VC-
backed IPOs tend to have higher first-day returns than the other groups. Based on the 
results, the higher underpricing leads to larger future cashflows of capital into VC-funds. 
Thus, the positive relationship between underpricing and future fundraising exist, which 
is constant with the Gompers (1996) grandstanding hypothesis, that young VC-firms 
publish companies via IPOs earlier than older VC-firms, to secure future fundraising of 
the new funds. (Lee & Wahal 2004; Gompers 1996.) 
 
Bessler and Siem (2012) found that the average underpricing between 1996 to 2010 was 
8.4.%. During the hot periods, the underpricing was up to 20% in the first wave during 
1998 to 2000 and during the second hot market period between the 2006 to 2007 the 
underpricing was lower. The tested sample consist of over 500 VC-backed IPOs in the 
European market, including two IPO waves and the financial crisis. (Bessler & Siem 
2012.) 
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3.2 Previous literature of IPOs performance 
The first studies of long-term performance were made by Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990), 
when they examine one-year aftermarket performance using sample of 1,589 IPOs on 
the US market. They found that IPOs show negative performance of 13.7% compared to 
market performance. The negative performance can be explained by investors optimism 
or initial overestimation of IPO valuation (Aggarwal & Rivoli 1990). Similar findings 
observe by Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) stating that the IPOs tend to 
underperform in the long-term compared to benchmarks. Investors need to invest 44% 
more when investing in issuing companies instead of non-issuers to achieve same wealth 
level after five years (Ritter 1991; Loughran & Ritter 1995). Ritter (1991) documents that 
investing in an IPO on the end of the first day and keeping it for 3 years, the value of the 
investment dropped by 17%. In addition, Ritter (1991) states that young companies and 
companies going public during the hot market tend to be even more underperformed in 
the long-term. Ritter (1991) mentions that one explanation for the long-term 
underperformance is that during high IPO volumes investor sentiment is high and 
investors are overoptimistic on the firm’s outlook. (Ritter 1991.) 
 
Levis (2011) documented evidence from the UK market when studying PE- (in this study 
buyout-backed) and VC-backed IPOs compared to non-sponsored IPOs. The result shows 
that PE-backed IPOs have superior performance compared to others. PE-backed IPOs 
achieve positive and significant returns in both equal- and value-weighted terms for the 
whole 36-month period in the aftermarket. The other groups VC- and non-sponsored-
backed IPOs performed poorly. Levis (2011) suggests that the superior performance is 
due to fact that PE-backed IPOs have higher leverage ratios and the fact that PE-
companies remain a proportion of the company after flotation, which increase the 
confidence of the investors. (Levis 2011.) 
 
Bergström et al. (2006) suggest that PE-backed companies outperform to their non-
sponsored counterparts in all time horizons. This is in line with the findings of Ritter 
(1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995). In addition, Bergström et al. (2006) state that 
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IPOs issued during the high-volume period show the worst underperformance in the 
long-term. This is strong evidence on the view that issuers are using the windows of 
opportunity when they are considering the timing of the IPO. The authors added that 
many of the private equity investors use the IPO market as an alternative route to exit 
in BO and VC investments. (Bergström et al. 2006.) 
 
Brav and Gompers (1997) studied the long-term performance of VC-backed and non-
sponsored IPOs. The authors gathered a comprehensive data set, covering over 4000 
new listings from 1972 to 1992 in the US market. Brav and Gompers (1997) found that 
VC-backed IPOs outperform compared to non-sponsored IPOs using the equal-weighted 
reurns, on the other hand, the value-weighting reduces the performance differences. 
Brav and Gompers (1997) explain that the VC-baked companies do not significantly 
underperform, while the smallest non-sponsored companies experience significant 
underperforming. However, the underperforming is not an impact of the IPO, as the 
similar small companies perform poorly as well. The second explanation relates to 
investor sentiment as the institutional are more confident to invest VC-backed IPOs, 
since they have more information through their investment in VC-funds. (Brav & 
Gompers 1997.)  
 
Krishnan, Ivanov, Masulis and Singh (2011), studied the VCs involvement to the long-
term performance. The results explain that the VC’s reputation has a significant impact 
on the long-term performance. Reputable VCs select better companies in terms of 
quality and the VCs are taking more active role in the corporate governance in post-IPO 
period. This post-IPO involvement leads to better aftermarket performance. (Krishnan 
et al.  2011). 
 
Katz (2009) explains how the ownership structures impact to the aftermarket 
performance and earnings quality. Katz (2009) findings show that PE-backed companies 
have higher earnings quality than those without the PE-sponsor, that they engage less 
in earnings management, and report more conservatively both before and after the IPO. 
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Moreover, PE-backed companies that are majority-owned (in this study buyout-backed) 
exhibit superior performance in the aftermarket compared to others. The results show 
that the professional ownership, closer monitoring and reputation of the sponsor lead 
to better aftermarket performance. (Katz 2009.) 
 
Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) tested more than 2000 IPOs and found that the 
offer price of the median IPO was significantly overvalued based on the industry 
multiples. This overvaluation varies from 14% to 50%, depending on the matching 
criteria. The results show that overvalued IPOs provide high first-day returns and low 
long-term returns. Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) explain this with the fact that 
the overvalued companies have higher growth forecasts and lower profitability and that 
the investors are more focused to the first mentioned. (Purnanandam & Swaminathan 
2004.) Similar findig was found by Levis (2011), who states that a negative relationship 
exists between high first-day returns and long-term IPO performance leading to 
underperformance in the long-term, although the relationship between BO-backed IPOs 
and the long-term performance is positive (Lewis 2011). 
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4. Data and methodology 
This paragraph explains the details on how the sample data have been formed using 
different data sources. In addition, the methodological choices are presented in this 
chapter. The focus on this research is to study underpricing of the IPOs, examine the 
long-term performance of new IPOs and compare the performance differences between 
buyout-, venture- and non-sponsored-backed IPOs. The sample consists of Nordic IPOs, 
including new initial issues in Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland. The reason for 
selecting the Nordic region is the lack of research in the region and the increased 
importance of Nordic private equity market. 
 
 
4.1 Sample identification 
The Nordic IPOs have been searched from SDC Platinum’s New Issue Database, which 
has also been used to collect ownership type, regardless of whether the IPO is buyout-, 
venture- or non-sponsored-backed. In previous studies, researchers have recommended 
to review data and cross-check the information from other online databases and 
possible alternative sources. Due to limited access to other online databases, the IPO 
type cross-check has been carried out through IPO prospectuses, public announcements 
of BO- and VC-firms’ and other information provided by local exchanges and 
associations. The classification has been a time-consuming process that has taken more 
time than expected in order to build a comprehensive data set. Without access to 
several databases that provide data on M&A transactions and without receiving 
information directly from PE- and VC-firms, the data used have been checked manually, 
trusting that the available data is correct. After checking the whole sample, the original 
data set were almost correct. The changes mainly concerned the type of the sponsor, 
regardless of whether the sponsor backing was either a buyout- or venture capital firm. 
Moreover, the quality of the data was initially good enough and cross-checking made it 
even more accurate.  
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As mentioned previously, the identification of PE- and VC-backed IPOs was challenging 
due to limited information publicly available from private companies, especially 
regarding the early part of the sample. The similarity of the sponsors in the Nordic 
market in order to ensure the correct sponsoring type has also been a challenge during 
the identification process. The IPO sponsoring data provided by the Finnish Venture 
Capital Association (FVCA) has helped a lot to confirm the ownership type of IPOs that 
have been sponsored prior to the listing.  In addition, detailed information on IPOs in 
Finland, Sweden and Denmark has been provided by NASDAQ. The result is a unique, 
hand-made data set, with a large number of sponsored and non-sponsored IPOs in the 
Nordic market over a large period of time, reaching from 2005 to mid-2016. The 
extensive timeframe used in this study makes it possible to examine the effects and the 
performance of IPO underpricing under different market conditions. The unique data 
set consist of 236 IPOs in the Nordic market during 2005 to 2016. 
 
 
4.2 Descriptive data 
The Thomson Reuter database provides historical stock market data for Nordic-based 
companies and it has been used in this study to compare the stock performance of the 
sample IPOs. The daily share prices of all sampled companies after the listing are 
gathered for 36 months. In addition, Thomson Reuters has been utilized by combining 
the company specific numbers of net sales and EBITDA margins, the total assets and 
total debts and the net operating assets and market values on an annual basis.  
 
Table 1 presents the IPO volumes per country for a time period of 2005 to 2016. The 
financial crisis of 2008 led to a collapse of the new IPOs, which took several years before 
the market picked up in 2010, until the euro crisis in 2012 stopped new issues for a year. 
As can be seen from the below table, in Sweden almost half of all IPOs have been issued. 
Sweden can be considered to be the most advanced Nordic country in terms of private 
equity players and the activity in the M&A market, but the other countries are catching 
up quickly. This is partly explained by the fact that Sweden is the largest country in the 
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Nordic region in terms of GDP, population and number of companies. Finland's strength 
lies in the success of engineering and technology, which is reflected by the fact that most 
high-tech companies and IPOs are made in the Finnish market. Norway on the other 
hand, is well known for the health tech clusters. (Argentum 2018.) 
 
Table 1 . IPO volumes per country.  
IPO Volumes 
Year Denmark Finland Norway Sweden ALL 
2005 2 2 12 5 21 
2006 4 3 12 10 29 
2007 5 1 16 13 35 
2008 0 0 4 3 7 
2009 1 0 0 0 1 
2010 3 0 7 7 17 
2011 1 0 4 7 12 
2012 0 1 2 0 3 
2013 1 2 8 1 12 
2014 1 6 11 16 34 
2015 1 11 6 32 50 
2016 2 3 1 9 15 
Total 21 29 83 103 236 
2016 includes only 5 months. 
 
When the listing time comes, the private equity sector is trying to make the issues during 
times when the markets are more optimistic and investor sentiment is high. A dramatic 
change can also be seen when comparing volumes before and after the financial crisis. 
The private equity sector has gained more capital during the past decade, which has also 
led to more exits. IPOs performed by the PE-industry are higher over the last three years 
than in the overall period. This can be seen from the below table 2. 
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Table 2 . IPO volumes by ownership group. (2016 includes only 5 months)  
IPO Volumes 
Year NS PEALL BO VC ALL 
2005 10 11 5 6 21 
2006 19 10 5 5 29 
2007 24 11 4 7 35 
2008 7 0 0 0 7 
2009 1 0 0 0 1 
2010 8 9 6 3 17 
2011 9 3 2 1 12 
2012 3 0 0 0 3 
2013 9 3 1 2 12 
2014 22 12 8 4 34 
2015 22 28 21 7 50 
2016 10 5 4 1 15 
Total 144 92 56 36 236 
2016 includes only 5 months. 
 
Table 3 presents data on the company specific key figures. As shown in the table, 
buyout-backed companies are larger in terms of market value and total assets. When 
comparing the market values of companies, BO-backed companies are more than three 
times bigger than the VC-backed and even more when comparing to non-sponsored. 
BO-backed companies are not only larger in terms of size, but also in other operational 
figures.  
 
BO-backed companies are also using more debt and have higher leverage than other 
groups. The total amount of debt is also ten times higher than the amounts in other 
groups. In terms of sales, BO-backed companies are significantly higher comparing to 
others. Sales figures are more than ten times higher than those without sponsorship or 
VC-backed. Thus, BO-backed companies are more mature and remarkably larger. BO-
backed companies are also more effective in terms of asset turnover when comparing 
ratios in the table 3. 
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Table 3.  Summary statistics of each IPO group used in this study . 
Indicator  Measure 
NS 
(144) 
PEALL 
(92) 
BO 
(56) 
VC 
(36) 
      
Market Value (MEUR) Median 92.6 199.9 377.4 106.8 
Net Sales (MEUR) Median 39.6 133.1 421.7 29.1 
Total Debts (MEUR) Median 9.4 41.6 121.6 2.1 
Total Assets (MEUR) Median 87.1 171.5 332.1 58.2 
Asset Turnover Median 0.5 0.8 1.1 0.5 
EBITDA (MEUR) Median 6.1 19.3 38.1 3.1 
EBITDA% Median 12 10 10 7 
Leverage% Median 19 24 29 6 
 
 
Table 4 shows the industries of the companies in the sample data. The data for the 
industry information has been retrieved from the Thomson Reuters database. As can be 
seen from the table, VC-backed IPOs dominate in the High Technology and Healthcare 
industries. PE backed companies on the other hand are concentrating more on 
Industrials and Retail industries. Moreover, non-sponsored IPOs appears more in 
traditional industries, such as in Financing and Real Estate. According to IPO volumes, 
the top three industries are Industrials, High Technology and Healthcare.  
Table 4. Industry distribution of IPOs (as a percentage of IPO volume) . 
Industry  NS PEALL BO VC ALL 
Consumer Products and Services 11.3 17.4 19.5 14.7 13.2 
Energy and Power 10.6 8 4.9 11.8 9.8 
Financial  11.3 4 4.9 2.9 8.9 
Healthcare 13.1 17.3 9.8 26.5 14.5 
High Technology 16.3 14.7 4.9 26.5 15.7 
Industrials 17.5 18.7 29.3 5.9 17.9 
Materials 1.9 0 0 0 1.3 
Media and Entertainment 0.6 4 4.9 2.9 1.7 
Real Estate 10.6 1.3 0 2.9 7.7 
Retail 3.8 13.3 19.5 5.9 6.8 
Telecommunications 3.1 1.3 2.4 0 2.6 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
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Moving into table 5, underpricing has been stable before the financial crisis, ranging 
from 3.5% to 5.4% with very little movement. The low volume is due to the financial 
crisis and the IPO market collision. The cold period after the financial crisis shows very 
low underpricing, even overpricing. The euro crisis in 2012 stopped the IPO market for 
a year but recovered quickly. Since 2013, the IPO volumes have grown steadily as well 
as underpricing, which can be explained by the hot market phenomena. The annual 
underpricing reached almost 15% in 2016, which is three times higher than before the 
financial crisis. The favorable IPO market has continued for years after the mid-2016, 
which is the end of the sample period used in this study. The results can be seen from 
the below table. 
Table 5 . Annual levels of underpricing between 2005 to mid-2016. 
Year 
 
Underpricing Amount of IPOs 
2005 
 
4.18 % 21 
2006  3.54 % 29 
2007  3.53 % 35 
2008  5.37 % 7 
2009  -11.76 % 1 
2010  -2.32 % 17 
2011  2.10 % 12 
2012  1.19 % 3 
2013  -0.61 % 12 
2014  2.61 % 34 
2015  9.91 % 50 
2016  14.75 % 15 
2016 includes only 5 months. 
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4.3 The variables of the empirical study 
The main focus is to study the impacts of the private equity industry involvement on the 
pricing of the initial issues and the long-term performance. In this study, to test the long-
term performance using the buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) method and OLS 
regression models to identify the impacts of the pre-IPO ownership. In addition, F-test 
has been used to compare the long-term performance between the groups. The returns 
are calculated by using the daily prices of each issue. The returns are compared to the 
MSCI Nordic index, which have been used as a benchmark. The variables of this study 
are presented in the next section, followed by a brief overview of the other variables 
used in the empirical study. 
 
 
4.3.1 Measurement of the underpricing 
The classic format of the IPO underpricing is usually defined in previous studies as initial 
return. In this study, the initial return is defined in the same way as Ljungqvist (2007: 
381), where the initial return is the closing price after the first trading day subtracted 
and divided by the IPO’s offer price. The initial return indicates as a percentage of how 
much the share price will rise or drop during the first trading day. The formula of 
underpricing can be presented as follows: 
 
(1) 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔 % =
(𝑃𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒− 𝑃𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒)
𝑃𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
   
 
where the underpricing is the first day closing price subtracted and divided by the offer 
price of the IPO. If the offer price is low and the closing price of the first day is much 
higher, the pre-IPO owners of the company have left “money on the table”. The amount 
of the money, which is not collected at the offering, is twice as much as fees to 
investment banks to arrange the IPO.  (Ljungqvist 2007: 381; Loughran & Ritter 2002). 
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In the previous studies of the IPO underpricing, only a few authors have used the 
adjusted returns. Most authors state that the adjustment is unnecessary, as the daily 
return of the market is typically much smaller than the average initial return of an IPO 
(Schöber 2007). 
 
 
4.3.2 Measurement of the share performance 
The second purpose of this research is to examine the share performance in short-, 
medium- and long-term return within different groups of IPOs. The buy-and-hold 
abnormal return method (BHAR) is used to measure the aftermarket risk-adjusted 
performance and the abnormal returns. The method is used to compare the return over 
a certain period of time against the benchmark index as a reference point. Previous 
studies by Ritter (1991), Loughran & Ritter (1995) and Lewis (2011), have identified a 
negative long-term BHAR return for companies that recently made an initial issue. BHAR 
has been calculated separately for each new issue. The dependent variable implies how 
a stock has been performed against the benchmark index, such as the MSCI Nordic index 
in this case.  
 
As an alternative approach, the F-test and OLS regression have been used to test the 
results in aftermarket performance and as well as to ensure the robustness of results. 
The dependent variable is the BHAR for the 36-month period.  
 
Previous researchers have not agreed on the best method to calculate the abnormal 
return of a share. In some studies, cumulative abnormal return (CAR) has been used as 
a measure for the aftermarket performance (Ritter 1991). Kothari and Warner (2007) 
state that there is no clear winner for the best method used, since all methods have low 
power to test economically interesting hypotheses and are not immune to 
misspecification (Kothari & Warner 2007). However, in the latest studies, BHAR has been 
the approach to measure the abnormal return. Equation 1 below presents the 
calculation process of buy-and-hold abnormal returns for each IPO in the sample: 
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(2) 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅 = 1
𝑁
∑  𝑛𝑖=0 [(∏  
𝑇
𝑡=1 (1 +  𝑟it)) −  (∏  
𝑇
𝑡=1 (1 +  𝑟bt))] 
   
 
where the 𝑟𝑖𝑡  equals to raw return of each IPO and  𝑟𝑏𝑡 in turn equals to the raw market 
return of the selected benchmark at the event month t. To test the hypothesis, t-test is 
used to measure if the BHAR’s average is equal to zero. To reject the null hypothesis, t-
the test should show that means are different from zero (Levis 2011).  Lyon, Barber and 
Tsai (1999) suggest that when using the buy-and-hold approach, the results are biased 
due to skewness. To eliminate the bias, they suggest using the bootstrapped skewness-
adjusted t-statistic, thus the method is applied also in this study. (Lyon et al. 1999.) The 
more advanced t-test based on Lyon et al. (1999) is shown below as: 
 
(3) 𝑡𝑠𝑎  =  √𝑛 (𝑆  +
1
3
 γ̂𝑆2  +
1
6𝑛
 ŷ), 
 
where 
 
(4) S =  𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝜎(𝐴𝑅𝑡)
, and γ̂ =  
∑ (𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡− 𝐴𝑅𝑡) 
3𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛𝜎(𝐴𝑅𝑡) 3
, 
 
where 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the buy-and-hold abnormal return for IPO i at the event month t, 𝐴𝑅𝑡 𝑡 is 
the sample mean and 𝜎(𝐴𝑅𝑡) the sample standard deviation of abnormal returns (Lyon 
et al. 1999). 
 
 
4.3.3 Private equity variables 
There is a lot of challenges in identifying different types of private equity-backed IPOs. 
The classification of the ownership status at the time of the IPO has been retrieved from 
the SDC Platinum database, and the information has been confirmed from the IPO 
prospectus and with company specific information provided by NASDAQ and FVCA. 
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There is no database where the identifications of the private equity-backed IPOs can be 
done reliably and easily, meaning that each IPO must be confirmed manually, which is a 
time-consuming process. The private equity companies have overlapping nature in the 
Nordics market, but the split between the buyout and the venture capital is based on 
the shareholding and the type of the private equity company. More work has been done 
to confirm the type of the IPO in the older issues in the sample, since the prospectus and 
the news or information have been removed from the company pages, especially if the 
company has gone bankrupt or has been involved in corporate reorganisations. The 
categorizing method has been performed based on the Schöber (2007) methodology.  
 
BO is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company has a private equity owner with 
majority ownership. VC in the other hand refers to venture capital or the business 
angel’s ownership with a minority stake of the company. The VC-dummy variable uses 
the same logic as the BO dummy variable. The combined dummy PEALL is defined if the 
issuing company have a private equity company as an owner. If the IPO is backed by a 
venture capital or a buyout the variable equals to 1, otherwise to 0. The combined 
dummy has been built to study the whole private equity industry impact for the long-
term performance. 
 
 
4.3.4 Other variables 
The first-day return variable explains the relationship between underpricing of the first 
trading day and the long-term performance. Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) 
reported that IPOs which are experiencing high first-day returns achieve lower returns 
in the long-term. The most overvalued IPOs tend to achieve the highest first-day returns 
instead of the most undervalued IPOs. Therefore, in the long-term, IPOs which have high 
first-day returns revert to fair value, leading to underperformance. (Purnanandam and 
Swaminathan 2004.) 
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The role of leverage as an IPO performance driver has been investigated in previous 
studies, but the evidence of the relation is rather mixed. According to Levis (2011), there 
is a positive relationship between leverage and long-term performance in PE-backed 
IPOs as one the main driver to achieve better performance than other groups. As 
previously mentioned, the findings are rather mixed with the impact of leverage. In 
contrast, Cao and Lerner (2009) found a negative relationship between the leverage and 
the IPO performance, although the results were statistically insignificant. To understand 
the impact of leverage as a driver of the IPO long-term performance, Gomes and Schmid 
(2010) suggest that the impact of leverage and stock performance is more complex and 
depend on how the debt has been used in the company (Gomes & Schmid 2010). 
 
The natural logarithm of total assets has been used to measure the company size. The 
total assets have been calculated by the number of shares multiplied with the share 
price at the time of issue. Bergström et al. (2006) and Brav, Geezy and Gompers (2000) 
found that larger companies tend to outperform in the long-term compared to smaller 
companies with low book-to-market ratios. Private equity-backed companies are, on 
average, larger than the non-sponsored peer companies according to previous findings 
as well as the companies included in this study. (Bergström et al. 2006; Brav et al. 2000.) 
 
Moreover, the variables explaining operating performance have included in this study 
to test whether there are impacts of operational characteristics for the long-term 
performance. The variables included are asset turnover and EBITDA margin, which 
explain how well the company can use the assets to create revenue and how profitable 
the company is. 
 
Hot and cold market dummy variables are showing the fluctuations in different market 
cycles. Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) and Ritter (1984) show that in the hot IPO markets, 
volumes of new issues are high, and the issues are oversubscribed constantly. During a 
hot market, underpricing is powerful and the returns are higher than normal after a few 
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months of the IPO. Thus, the underpricing is higher during the hot markets than during 
cold markets. (Ibbotson & Jaffe 1975; Ritter 1984.) 
 
 
4.4 Regression models 
The regression models have been built after the IPO identification process to test the 
aftermarket performance in the long-term and the robustness of the results. The models 
are tested against dependent variable, which consist of the long-term performance 
measure of the initial issues. The idea is to first divide IPOs into two separate groups of 
private equity-backed and non-sponsored IPOs by using a dummy variable. After the first 
categorization, private equity-backed IPOs have been divided to BO and VC groups based 
on the ownership type. In order to test whether there are any differences in timing of 
the IPO, hot and cold market dummies are used to capture the effect. Several 
regressions have been built to find which variables explain the results.  
 
Regression models use the BHAR in 36 months period as the dependent variable.  The 
regressions can be seen below.  
 
(5) 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅 36 = 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 +
𝛽2 log(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡) + 𝛽3𝑃𝐸𝐴𝐿𝐿 + 𝛽4𝐻𝑜𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 +
𝛽5𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 
 
(6) 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅 36 = 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 +
𝛽2 log(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡) + 𝛽3𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽4𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴% +
𝛽5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽6𝑃𝐸𝐴𝐿𝐿 + 𝛽7𝐻𝑜𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 
 
In the regression models (3) and (4), sponsored IPOs have been divided to BO- or VC-
backed groups using dummy variables, reflecting the type of the private equity. As 
mentioned earlier, there are significant differences in investment strategies between 
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buyout and venture capital investments. Otherwise, the regression follows the same 
pattern as above.  
 
(7) 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅 36 = 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 +
𝛽2 log(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡) + 𝛽3𝑉𝐶 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑂 + 𝛽5𝐻𝑜𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 
 
(8) 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅 36 = 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 +
𝛽2 log(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡) + 𝛽3𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽4𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴% +
𝛽5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽6𝑉𝐶 + 𝛽7𝐵𝑂 + 𝛽8𝐻𝑜𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 +
𝛽9𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 
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5. Results of empirical study 
This section presents the results of the empirical part of the study. First, the results of 
underpricing are presented for all groups and for different IPO cycles based on the IPO 
volumes. Secondly, abnormal short-, medium- and long-term returns of IPOs using BHAR 
method are presented as well as the F-test to examine the performance differences 
between the ownership groups. Finally, the results of OLS regression model for a long-
term performance are presented to cover all the hypotheses in this study. 
 
 
5.1 Results for underpricing and the IPO cyclicality 
The results in table 6 show the underpricing returns for all groups with different IPO 
cyclicality periods. At first glance, all IPO groups tend to be underpriced throughout the 
period at both the equal- and value-weighted basis at the 1% significance level, except 
for underpricing of VC-backed IPOs, which are not statistically significant in the equal-
weighted average method. The value-weighted average result, on the other hand, show 
underpricing at the 1% significance level, which can be seen as the bigger companies by 
market capitalization to be dragging up the underpricing average. Furthermore, the first 
section, which covers all IPOs for the entire period, equals to 4.6% of underpricing at the 
1% significance level at the equal-weighted average and also with the same significance 
level, the underpricing is 9.8% at the value-weighted average. Underpricing percentage 
is in line with previous studies in the European market, to mention for example Gandolfi, 
Regalli, Soana and Arcuri (2018) and Bergrstöm et al. (2006). Gandolfi et al. (2018) found 
that the underpricing in the most developed mainland European countries are just 
above 6%, while in France the underpricing is 6,4%, in Germany 5.3% and in Italy 6.1% 
(Gandolfi et al. 2018).   
 
An interesting pattern can be seen by comparing the US and UK first-day returns with 
Nordic returns. Underpricing in US an UK appears to be higher when comparing all IPOs 
without the effect of the ownership type, e.g. Levis (2011) found the underpricing in the 
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UK market at 18.6% and Ritter in the US market at 21.1% between 2000 to 2017 (Ritter 
2017). Thus, the Nordic underpricing seems to be at a lower level compared to the US 
and the UK market. Therefore, the hypothesis H1 is supported, since IPOs are 
underpriced on the first trading day significantly. 
 
The result is surprising when comparing buyout-backed IPOs and non-sponsoring IPOs.  
Buyout-backed IPOs are more underpriced than non-sponsoring IPOs, which contradicts 
Levis (2011) findings in the UK market and Schöber (2007). The difference between 
buyout- and non-sponsoring IPOs is even greater with the value-weighted method. One 
explanation may be that although there have been private equity investors in the Nordic 
countries for a long time, the industry has grown significantly in the last decade, while 
in the US and in major European markets, private equity companies have played a more 
significant role, especially when listing companies through IPOs. Therefore, the 
certification of the PE-industry does not apply to the Nordic level based on this study.  
 
Furthermore, when looking at the results of VC-backed IPO underpricing, it can be noted 
that the VC-backed IPOs experience the lowest degree of underpricing across the sample 
with equal-weighted average basis, which is in line with the findings of Megginson and 
Weiss (1991), although the results are not statistically significant. The result shows 
underpricing of 1.49% without statistical significance and 16.6% at the significance level 
of 1%. In all time periods, underpricing of the VC-backed IPOs are not statistically 
significant, although the entire period and hot period are statistically significant by 
value-weighted terms. Megginson and Weiss (1991) suggest that when a private equity 
company issue a new company on the public stock exchange, the degree of underpricing 
is lower due to a certification that the issued company has been managed by the private 
equity company, thus the investors are more confident to invest in those IPOs. Thus, the 
lower degree of underpricing in BO- and VC-backed IPOs cannot be confirmed in this 
study.  
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The findings from different IPO cyclicality is also interesting especially from the 
perspective of the timing of private equity-backed IPOs. During the hot period, IPO 
volumes are higher as well as underpricing of IPOs in equal-weighted basis which 
supported by the previous studies for instance Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) and Ritter 
(1991). An exception can be detected during a neutral period where buyout companies 
experienced high underpricing of 16.4% using the value-weighted method, but the 
equal-weighted average basis underpricing follows the same pattern that during hot 
periods, IPOs experience higher underpricing than during other periods. This is in line 
with the thot and cold market theory of Ritter (1991) and Ibbotson & Jaffe (1975). During 
cold market period, IPO underpricing is negative in PE-backed IPOs, which shows that 
the investor sentiment is cautious leading to overpricing of IPOs, though the result is 
only significant at the 10% significant level. Moreover, underpricing during cold period 
is not showing any statistically significant results. Therefore, the hypothesis H2 is 
supported that the IPOs experience higher underpricing during hot periods in Nordic 
level. 
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Table 6 . Underpricing of different ownership groups and the IPO cyclicality.  
Underpricing All NS PEALL BO VC 
Panel A. entire period  
Equal-weighted average 4.6%*** 4.59%*** 4.6%*** 6.61%*** 1.49% 
  (5.43) (4.03) (3.69) (6.11) (0.56) 
Value-weighted average 9.78%*** 7.03%*** 11.78%*** 10.62%*** 16.16%*** 
  (11.16) (6.28) (7.4) (6.33) (3.44) 
Median 2.26 % 2.02 % 2.26 % 5.22 % 0.00 % 
Observations  236 144 92 56 36 
Panel B. hot period 
Equal-weighted average 5.99%*** 5.52%*** 6.66%*** 7.78%*** 4.66% 
  (5.37) (3.5) (4.48) (6.72) (1.24) 
Value-weighted average 11.01%*** 9.91%*** 11.56%*** 9.71%*** 17.82%*** 
  (9.33) (6.11) (7.08) (7.38) (3.36) 
Median 3.16 % 2.35 % 5.42 % 7.50 % 0.86 % 
Observations  155 91 64 41 23 
Panel C. cold period 
Equal-weighted average 1.72% 3.69% -6.45%* -5.36% -7.26% 
  (0.8) (1.62) (-2.01) (-1.08) (-1.83) 
Value-weighted average 0.81% 1.22% -0.52% 0.03% -5.05% 
  (0.4) (0.55) (-0.32) (-0.22) (-1.38) 
Median 0.00 % 0.00 % -0.43 % 0.00 % -1.88 % 
Observations  36 29 7 3 4 
Panel D. neutral period 
Equal-weighted average 2.1% 2.15% 2.04% 5.61%*** -2.72% 
  (1.56) (1.22) (0.99) (4.45) (-0.83) 
Value-weighted average 7.81%** 3.66%* 14.57%*** 16.39%*** -0.28% 
  (2.47) (1.95) (-17.64) (-37.44) (-0.13) 
Median 1.67 % 1.85 % 0.23 % 4.01 % 0.00 % 
Observations  45 24 21 12 9 
The sample consists of 236 Nordic IPOs of which 144 are non-sponsored, 56 of buyout-backed and 36 of 
venture capital-backed. Returns are measured as percentage from the offer price to end of first trading 
day. Returns are non-adjusted. An asterisk refers to significance one at the 10% level; two at the 5% level; 
three at the 1% level. T-statistics are reported in the parentheses.  
 
 
5.2 Nordic BHAR 
The results of the Nordic buy-and-hold returns are presented in table 7 below, which is 
divided into two parts based on the calculation method. The first part is calculated using 
the equal-weighted average and the second part is calculated using the value-weighted 
average, where the inflation-adjusted market capitalization on the listing date has been 
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used. The IPO performance has been calculated for the first month and on a yearly basis 
thereafter. As previously mentioned, Lyon and Barber (1999) suggest that when using a 
buy-and-hold approach, the results are biased due to skewness. To eliminate the bias, 
the skewness-adjusted t-statistic has been used. At first glance, two observations can be 
seen immediately from the long-term performance over a 36-month period. First, the 
results show more positive than negative returns between different groups, and second, 
buyout-backed IPOs tend to outperform, while venture capital-backed IPOs 
underperform with significant results.  
Table 7. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns in different time periods for each IP O 
group. 
Window Equal-weighted average (%) Value-weighted average (%) 
 All IPO  
(236) 
NS  
(144) 
PEALL  
(92) 
BO  
(56) 
VC 
(36) 
All IPO  
(236) 
NS  
(144) 
PEALL  
(92) 
BO 
(56) 
VC 
(36) 
1M -1.07% -1.01% -1.16% -0.02% -2.93% -1.74% -1.59% -1.85%* 0.39% -10.39% 
 (-1.05) (-0.66) (-1.09) (-0.01) (-1.36) (-1.63) (-1.02) (-1.7) (0.36) (-1.27) 
12M 11.77%*** 10.58%* 13.63%** 23.79%*** -2.17% 7.37%* 15.95%*** 1.15% -3.94% 20.48%** 
 (2.89) (1.94) (2.35) (2.95) (-0.31) (1.72) (3.07) (0.24) (-0.2) (2.11) 
24M 8.77% 8.99% 8.43% 23.02%*** -14.27% 9.55%* 7.5% 11.03% 8.98% 18.8% 
 (1.62) (1.2) (1.15) (2.92) (-1.01) (1.77) (1.00) (1.51) (1.07) (1.47) 
36M 8.05% 7.42% 9.03% 35.62%** -32.34%** 16.06%** 8.87% 21.27%** 33.06%** -23.52%* 
 (1.11) (0.82) (0.84) (2.54) (-2.3) (2.34) (0.98) (2.07) (2.33) (-1.87) 
The sample consists of 236 Nordic IPOs of which 144 are non-sponsored, 56 of buyout-backed and 36 of 
venture capital-backed. MSCI Nordic index has been used as a benchmark index. Returns are measured 
as percentage returns from first day close to end of each period as in the window column. An asterisk 
refers to significance one at the 10% level; two at the 5% level; three at the 1% level. T-statistics are 
reported in the parentheses. 
 
 
Looking at all IPOs, the results show weak evidence of aftermarket outperformance over 
a 36-month period. The equal-weighted average is 8.05%, although the result is 
statistically insignificant, and the value-weighted average in turn is 16.06% over a 36-
month period. Therefore, the hypothesis H3 is not supported that the new issues overall 
underperform in the long-term compared to the benchmark.  While the results of IPO 
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outperformance are only significant using the value-weighted average basis and there is 
no evidence of underperformance in the long-term, except for VC-backed IPOs. 
Moreover, the findings are in contrast with Levis (2011) and Ritter (1991), who found 
that in the UK and US markets, the IPOs tend to underperform compared to benchmark, 
although Levis (2011) found some outperformance in the long-term, when IPOs were 
tested to industry-adjusted benchmark. The positive aftermarket performance was also 
observed by Westerholm (2006) in the Nordic market. Westerholm (2006) found that 
IPOs in Norway and Denmark achieved positive returns, while returns in Sweden and 
Finland were negative when calculating the 5-year BHAR.  Furthermore, an interesting 
point can be observed when looking at the aftermarket performance over a 12-month 
period. The results show that all groups are outperforming, except of VC-backed IPOs, 
with statistically significant results.  
 
An interesting difference can be found when splitting the private equity-backed IPOs 
into buyout and venture capital groups. The results reveal superior performance of the 
buyout-backed IPOs, which experience an outperformance of 35.62% using the equal-
weighted method, and 33.06% using the value-weighted method. The results are 
significant at the 5% significance level. BO-backed IPOs have significantly higher long-
term performance than any other group. These findings are consistent with previous 
researches, e.g. Katz (2009), Levis (2011) and Schöber (2007).  
 
Moving forward, the only group underperforming against the benchmark are the VC-
backed IPOs, where significant underperformance is found in both equal- and value-
weighted measures. Venture capital-backed IPOs are experiencing negative returns of 
over 30% using the equal-weighted method and more than 20% using the value-
weighted terms.  The findings of poor performance of the VC-backed IPOs are supported 
by previous studies, e.g. by findings of Levis (2011) in the UK market, as well as Brav and 
Gompers (1997) in the US market. On the other hand, the results partly contradict the 
findings of Bessler and Seim (2012). Bessler and Seim (2012) suggest that the 
performance of VC-backed IPOs is positive for at least one year, after which the returns 
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start to decrease, but the return remain positive until the third year until it turns 
negative. They suggest further that after a year, the lock-up period ends, and VC-firms 
can divest the remaining shares. This theory is supported by these results as the 
decrease in returns begins after 12 months, albeit the impact of the lock-up period 
cannot be confirmed, since the data are not including the information of the lock-up 
agreements. The same theory applies to BO-backed IPOs, but the evidence of the 
possible impact of the lock-up agreements cannot be confirmed as the returns of BO-
backed IPOs are increasing after 12 months. In addition, Bessler and Seim (2012) state 
that VCs can time the issues to periods of high valuation and tend to over valuate the 
issues. This is constant with the findings of this study as VC-backed IPOs are less 
underpriced compared to all IPOs when using the equal-weighted average approach.  
 
The F-test has been used in table 8 as an alternative approach to test the long-term 
performance during a 36-month period. When comparing the averages of the long-term 
performance of the different ownership groups, it can be seen that buyout-backed IPOs 
experience higher aftermarket performance than other groups. Furthermore, the results 
are significant when comparing to non-sponsor-backed IPOs at the 5% significance level 
and when comparing against venture capital-backed IPOs at the 1% level. In addition, 
comparing non-sponsor-backed IPOs to venture capital-backed IPOs the result is 
significant at the 1% level. All things considered, the hypothesis H4 can be supported, 
proving that the long-term performance differs between the groups. As shown, buyout-
backed IPOs perform better in the long-term compared to other groups and 
respectively, non-sponsored IPOs perform better compared to venture capital-backed 
IPOs. 
 
Table 8. F-test to compare long-term returns for 36-month period. 
  BO NS BO VC   NS VC 
Mean % 35.62% 7.42% 35.62% -32.34%  7.42% -32.34% 
Listings 56 144 56 36  144 36 
F 1.57** 5.01***  3.20*** 
p-value 0.02 0.00   0.00 
 An asterisk refers to significance one at the 10% level; two at the 5% level; three at the 1% level 
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5.3 Results of OLS regression model 
The OLS regression has been used as an alternative approach to test the long-term 
performance. The regressions are run with the Newey-West’s correction to adjust 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, leading to robust t-statistics.  
Table 9.  OLS regression results for 36-month period with IPO cyclicality.   
Variable 
Regression 
 (1) 
Regression  
(2) 
Regression  
(3) 
Regression  
(4) 
Intercept 0.259 0.223 0.474 0.544 
 (0.693) (0.507) (1.078) (0.965) 
First-day return  -0.231 -0.433 -0.346 -0.511 
 (-0.514) (-0.871) (-0.745) (-0.993) 
Log of total assets  -0.056 -0.040 -0.099 -0.089 
 (-1.04) (-0.757) (-1.513) (-1.128) 
Asset turnover   0.0544  -0.045 
 
 (0.442)  (-0.283) 
EBITDA-%   0.002  0.002 
 
 (0.00)  (0.505) 
Leverage  -0.357*  -0.428* 
 
 (-1.823)  (-1.888) 
PEALL 0.015 0.013   
 (0.104) (0.081) 
  
BO   0.376 0.401 
 
  (1.582) (1.354) 
VC   -0.515** -0.521** 
 
  (-2.468) (-2.345) 
Hot market 0.148 0.166 0.130 0.163 
 (0.653) (0.783) (0.572) (0.783) 
Cold market -0.082 -0.057 -0.104 -0.083 
 (-0.262) (-0.183) (-0.321) (-0.256) 
R2 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.06 
Observations 236 236 236 236 
The sample consists of 236 Nordic IPOs of which 144 are NS, 56 BO- and 36 VC-backed. MSCI Nordic index 
has been used as a benchmark index.  Return is measured as percentage from first day close to end of the 
36-month period. An asterisk refers to significance one at the 10% level; two at the 5% level; three at the 
1% level. T-statistics are reported in the parentheses. 
 
 
Table 8 summarizes the results of the regressions used in this study. Firstly, the results 
support some of the findings and hypotheses presented earlier in this study. The long-
term outperformance of IPOs presented in table 7, the results of OLS regression models 
are giving support as the sign of the intercepts is also positive. As the results are 
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statistically insignificant for all IPOs as in table 7 and in addition, the regressions show 
the positive sign for the intercept. Thus, the first hypothesis H3 is still not supported and 
cannot be accepted, since there is no evidence that all sample IPOs underperform 
compared to benchmark. 
 
The first-day return variable shows a significant negative relation between the first-day 
return and the long-term performance in all the regressions. The first-day return in all 
regressions show a negative relationship, although the results are not statistically 
significant. Thus, it can be said that there is a negative relationship between 
underpricing and long-term performance, but the evidence is not strong enough to 
make it statistically significant. In view of the above, the hypothesis H5 is not supported, 
since the negative relationship between underpricing and long-term performance is not 
statistically significant. Levis (2011) and Purnanandam & Swaminathan (2004) found the 
negative relationship in the long-term and explained that underpricing is not sustainable 
and the valuation of the company has been corrected in the long-term (Levis 2011; 
Purnanandam & Swaminathan 2004). 
 
The table above shows significant underperformance of VC-backed IPOs at the 5% 
significance level, which is line with the findings of Chen and Liang (2016). After having 
studied 3,771 IPOs in the US market during a time between 1970 and 2007, Chen and 
Liang found that venture capital-backed IPOs underperform compared to other IPOs. 
The mains reasons for this were the weaker operating performance and the tendency of 
investors to overinvestment at the time of the offering. The result is consistent with 
table 7, which shows that venture capital -backed IPOs underperform significantly in the 
long-term. In addition, as discussed earlier in this study, BO-backed IPOs show the 
positive coefficient for the long-term performance, although the results are not 
statistically significant.  The presented results are therefore consistent to the long-term 
performance of the buyout and venture capital-backed IPOs, even though for buyout-
backed IPOs the results are not significant, but the positive sign of the variable support 
the findings of buyout-backed IPOs aftermarket performance.  
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The variable of leverage shows negative impact for the regressions (2) and (4) at the 10% 
significant level. The results are, on the one hand, in line with the findings by Cao and 
Lerner (2009) and on the other hand, the results contradict with the findings of Levis 
(2011) in the UK market.  There is no academic consensus on how the leverage impact 
for the long-term performance.  
 
In addition, the timing of the IPO does not appear to have an impact on the long-term 
performance, as the hot and cold period dummies are not showing any reasonable 
significant levels. As noted for hot and cold dummies, the coefficients for the remaining 
variables are not statistically significant at any reasonable level and can therefore not 
explain the performance of long-term performance. Although in previous studies, for 
example size and profitable variables has been able to explain the long-term 
performance, although the results have been rather mixed. 
 
In summary, OLS regressions support venture capital-backed IPOs in the long-term, 
while the performance of all IPOs remains statistically insignificant as well as buyout-
backed IPOs are not statistically significant with the OLS method, although the evidence 
is consistent of the positive performance of the all IPOs and buyout-backed IPOs in the 
long-term. However, the adjusted R-square is relatively low for the regression models, 
which indicate that the regression models have difficulties in explaining the long-term 
performance of the sample used in this study, although the results provide support and 
ensure the robustness in part of the main hypotheses. 
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6. Conclusions 
The purpose of this study is to examine the pricing and the long-term performance of 
new initial public offerings (IPOs) in the Nordic market. This study focuses in particular 
on the impact of the pre-IPO ownership on the pricing and long-term performance. The 
IPOs are divided by the ownership type to three different groups, buyout- (BO), venture 
capital- (VC) and non-sponsored-backed (NS). Previous studies have found significant 
differences in the underpricing of IPOs and long-term performance across owner groups. 
Further, the study examines and tries to provide answers for questions on how the IPOs 
act in short- and long-term in the Nordic market compared to other major developed 
markets as well as which kind of role the ownership type plays, when companies are 
issued for the first time on public stock exchanges.  
 
This study has used a sample consisting of 236 IPOs from 2005 to mid-2016 in the 
Swedish, Finnish, Norwegian and Danish markets. To test the underpricing and long-
term performance of the sample IPOs, three different methods have been applied in this 
study. For each IPO, buy-and-hold abnormal return has been calculated to test the 
aftermarket performance, and for testing differences in the long-term between groups 
F-test has been utilized to support the results. In addition, OLS regression analysis have 
been used as an alternative approach to test long-term performance of all IPOs. The 
sample has been compared to MSCI Nordic Index, which has been used as a benchmark 
index to measure the aftermarket performance. 
 
Private equity investments are popular at the moment and the IPO market is enjoying 
high IPO volumes for the first time after the financial crisis. The Nordic private equity 
industry has been attracting more and more capital during the last decade and the 
investment amounts to portfolio companies has grown rapidly in recent years. Individual 
Nordic countries are small compared to major economies, for instance the US, UK and 
the biggest European countries, but in the Nordic level, the size of the market is relevant, 
especially in the technology sector. When comparing the investment amounts that PE-
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industry has made to the early stage companies during the past few years, the Nordic 
market has performed superiorly compared to other countries in Europe.  
 
Buyout-backed IPOs tend to be larger and use more leverage than other sample IPOs. 
Moreover, the buyout-backed IPOs are three times bigger than the other IPOs in the 
sample. While buyout companies focus more on consumer goods and industrial sectors, 
venture capitalists are focusing more on high technology and the healthcare sector, 
including pharmacy sectors. Non-sponsored IPOs, on the other hand, are covering over 
several sectors.  
 
According to previous studies, the phenomena of the first-day underpricing of the IPOs 
show similar patterns in the Nordic market than in other similar markets. The results of 
underpricing show significant returns for all groups when calculating with the value-
adjusted method and also with the equal-weighted approach, except for VC-backed 
IPOs. As shown previously in this study, the first-day return is 4.6% for all IPOs with 
equal-weighted approach. Furthermore, based on previous studies, the first-day 
underpricing has shown lower returns in the developed markets than in the emerging 
markets and the results of this study is consistent with that finding. On the other hand, 
no evidence was found of lower underpricing for the PE-backed IPOs than for the non-
sponsored IPOs. Thus, the IPOs experience underpricing on the first trading day and the 
same pattern which has been documented in other markets also applies in the Nordic 
market. Moreover, the first-day returns are lower in the Nordic market than in the US 
and UK markets, which is proven in previous studies. The explanation could relate to IPO 
volumes, which are higher in the US and UK markets, which could lead to more attractive 
valuations in order to make IPOs attractive and thus, leading to higher first-day returns.   
 
When the IPO has been done during a hot period, the underpricing tend to be higher. In 
other periods, the underpricing is lower, and during the cold market period even 
overpricing has been evidenced. Thus, it can be stated that underpricing is higher during 
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the hot period, which can be explained by the investor sentiment. In addition, the finding 
is line with previous studies, e.g. Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975). 
 
The results of this study show evidence of the aftermarket outperformance of the IPOs 
in the long-term. All IPOs experience on average positive returns of long-term 
performance when calculating with the value-adjusted method. On the other hand, the 
evidence is not statistically significant when calculating with the equal-weighted 
method. The results are showing statistically significant returns for the buyout-backed 
IPOs. The impact is positive in the long-term when buyout-backed IPOs are, on average, 
outperforming. The buyout investment strategy focuses on larger and more mature 
companies. In contrast, for the venture capitalists specializing in early stage funding of 
the companies, the aftermarket performance is significantly negative. Thus, the 
evidence of the long-term underperformance can be only confirmed for VC-backed IPOs. 
However, the stock performance has been compared only to MSCI Nordic index and the 
sample size is not as large as Levis (2011) or other main studies on the subject, although 
in the Nordic level the sample size is comprehensive.  
 
Furthermore, the buyout-backed IPOs experience better long-term performance, is 
supported as the results show that buyout-backed IPOs have statistically significant 
outperformance, and the venture capital-backed IPOs on the other hand, are performing 
poorly.  The F-test has been used as an alternative approach to ensure the performance 
differences between groups, and the test support the findings. Moreover, non-
sponsored IPOs are experiencing positive returns, although the results are not 
statistically significant. Further, the negative relationship between the first-day returns 
and the long-term performance exists, although the results are not statistically 
significant, albeit the evidence shows negative relationship.  
 
This study has used the SDC Platinum’s New Issue online database for retrieving the IPO 
sample data, which have been cross-checked with the company webpages and IPO 
prospectus where available. Some of the IPOs had to be excluded from the sample as 
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the information was not available. Therefore, the sample size somewhat decreased, but 
the total sample is still comprehensive in the Nordic level. In addition, there may be 
some issues in the sample relating to the dividing of the IPOs to three groups based on 
the sponsoring type, which could create a bias result. The Nordic sponsors have an 
overlapping nature when investing to the portfolio companies, which could be shown as 
some of the buyout-backed IPOs should be venture capital-backed and vice versa. 
Furthermore, country characteristic and macro variables have been left outside of this 
study, as the focus has been more to examine the impact of the ownership type of the 
IPOs. 
 
For further researches, it would interesting to understand the sponsors impact on the 
IPOs in more detail, for instance if there are any impacts in situations where the sponsor 
is more experienced or have a better track record in issuing the companies via IPOs. 
Further, the difference between the BO- and VC-backed performance would be 
interesting to examine in order to understand which drivers are affecting that. 
Moreover, the private equity value creation is one thing which could be interesting to 
measure in more detail, especially in terms of operational performance and strategic 
choices during the ownership. This would be useful information for all investors 
attending IPOs in order for the investors to understand more precise the drivers that are 
affecting the superior performance of the buyout-backed companies.  
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Appendix: Sample IPOs 
Issuer Issue  
Date 
Issuer Issue  
Date 
PetroJack ASA 2/23/2005 Boule Diagnostics AB 6/23/2011 
Neste Oil Corporation 4/18/2005 Danske Andelskassers 
Bank A/S 
7/7/2011 
Aker Seafoods ASA 5/13/2005 Hoegh LNG Holdings Ltd 7/5/2011 
Havila Shipping ASA 5/24/2005 Hofseth Biocare ASA 12/2/2011 
AffectoGenimap Oyj 5/27/2005 Selvaag Bolig ASA 6/14/2012 
TopoTarget A/S 6/10/2005 Siili Solutions Oyj 10/15/2012 
Kongsberg Automotive ASA 6/24/2005 Borregaard ASA 10/18/2012 
Eidesvik Offshore ASA 6/27/2005 Asetek A/S 3/20/2013 
Revus Energy ASA 6/27/2005 EAM Solar ASA 3/26/2013 
Indutrade AB 10/5/2005 Serodus ASA 4/9/2013 
Hemtex AB 10/6/2005 Multiclient Geophysical 
ASA 
5/2/2013 
TrygVesta A/S 10/13/2005 Matas 6/28/2013 
Cermaq ASA 10/24/2005 Ocean Yield AS 7/5/2013 
Powel ASA 10/24/2005 Odfjell Drilling AS 9/27/2013 
Bergesen Worlwide Gas 
ASA 
10/25/2005 Orava 
Asuinkiinteistorahasto O 
10/14/2013 
Biotec Pharmacon ASA 11/4/2005 Restamax Oyj 11/28/2013 
TradeDoubler AB 11/8/2005 Platzer Fastigheter AB 11/29/2013 
Orexo AB 11/9/2005 Napatech A/S 12/6/2013 
ODIM ASA 11/18/2005 LINK Mobility Group ASA 12/12/2013 
Hakon Invest AB 12/8/2005 Oscar Properties Holding 
AB 
2/17/2014 
Funcom A/S 12/13/2005 Bufab AB 2/21/2014 
KappAhl AB 2/23/2006 ISS A/S 3/13/2014 
Salcomp Oy 3/13/2006 Saniona AB 4/22/2014 
 68 
Ahlstrom Paper Group Oy 3/14/2006 Hemfosa Fastigheter AB 3/21/2014 
Block Watne AS 3/17/2006 Recipharm AB 4/3/2014 
Electra Gruppen AB 5/4/2006 Verkkokauppa.com Oyj 4/4/2014 
Renewable Energy Corp 
ASA 
5/9/2006 D Carnegie & Co AB 4/9/2014 
Dios Fastigheter AB 5/22/2006 Scanship Holding ASA 4/11/2014 
BW Offshore Limited 5/31/2006 Herantis Pharma Oyj 6/11/2014 
Insplanet AB 6/7/2006 Besqab AB 6/12/2014 
Swedol AB 6/12/2006 Cleantech Invest Oyj 6/12/2014 
Ability Group ASA 7/3/2006 Com Hem Holding AB 6/17/2014 
Melker Schorling AB 9/5/2006 Bactiguard Holding AB 6/19/2014 
Biovitrum AB 9/15/2006 Zalaris ASA 6/20/2014 
Wirtek A/S 10/2/2006 Next Biometrics Group 
ASA 
6/25/2014 
Mondo A/S 10/13/2006 Scandi Standard AB 6/27/2014 
Outotec 10/10/2006 cXense AS 7/1/2014 
Austevoll Seafood ASA 10/11/2006 Havyard Group AS 7/1/2014 
Marine Farms ASA 10/12/2006 Inwido AB 9/26/2014 
Codfarmers ASA 10/19/2006 Scatec Solar ASA 10/2/2014 
Eitzen Chemical ASA 11/2/2006 XXL ASA 10/3/2014 
AKVA Group ASA 11/10/2006 Granges AB 10/10/2014 
Veloxis Pharmaceuticals A/S 11/13/2006 Absolent Group AB 10/16/2014 
Norwegian Property AS 11/15/2006 Entra ASA 10/17/2014 
BE Group AB 11/24/2006 Nexstim Oyj 11/14/2014 
Lindab International AB 12/1/2006 Lifco AB 11/21/2014 
Faktor Eiendom ASA 12/8/2006 United Bankers Oy 11/24/2014 
FirstFarms A/S 12/12/2006 Thule Group AB 11/26/2014 
Tilgin AB 12/15/2006 B2Holding ASA 12/4/2014 
Reservoir Exploration 12/21/2006 NP3 Fastigheter AB 12/4/2014 
Simtronics ASA 1/5/2007 Nixu Oyj 12/5/2014 
Enalyzer 2/13/2007 RenoNorden AS 12/16/2014 
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NEAS ASA 3/23/2007 Eltel AB 2/6/2015 
Algeta ASA 3/27/2007 Dustin Group AB 2/13/2015 
ElectroMagnetic GeoService 
AS 
3/30/2007 The Lexington Co AB 2/18/2015 
SalMar ASA 5/8/2007 NNIT A/S 3/6/2015 
ScanArc ASA 5/10/2007 Piippo Oyj 3/10/2015 
Fred Olsen Production ASA 5/11/2007 Detection Technology Oy 3/16/2015 
NAXS 5/14/2007 Evolution Gaming Group 
AB 
3/20/2015 
Bouvet ASA 5/15/2007 Nordic Nanovector AS 7/8/2014 
Nederman Holding AB 5/16/2007 Hoist Finance AB 3/25/2015 
Dannemora Mineral AB 5/25/2007 Asiakastieto Group OYJ 3/27/2015 
Protector Forsikring ASA 5/25/2007 Troax Group AB 3/27/2015 
Exiqon A/S 5/29/2007 Savo-Solar Oy 4/2/2015 
Badger Explorer ASA 6/12/2007 Tobii AB 4/24/2015 
SRV Yhtiot Oyj 6/12/2007 Robit Oyj 5/21/2015 
DIBS A/S 6/18/2007 Multiconsult AS 5/22/2015 
Esoft Systems A/S 6/19/2007 SciBase Holding AB 6/2/2015 
Grieg Seafood ASA 6/21/2007 Pihlajalinna Oy 6/4/2015 
24SevenOffice ASA 6/22/2007 Magnolia Bostad AB 6/9/2015 
Northern Logistics Property 6/22/2007 Collector AB 6/10/2015 
EOS Russia 6/25/2007 Inission AB 6/10/2015 
Cecon ASA 6/26/2007 Vistin Pharma ASA 6/10/2015 
Pronova BioPharma ASA 10/11/2007 Talenom Oyj 6/11/2015 
Systemair AB 10/12/2007 Prime Living AB 6/12/2015 
HMS Industrial Networks 
AB 
10/19/2007 A Group Of Retail Assets 6/15/2015 
Vinovo AB 10/22/2007 Coor Svc Mgmt Hldg AB 6/16/2015 
West International AB 10/26/2007 Hovding Sverige AB 6/16/2015 
Avega AB 11/1/2007 Alimak Group AB 6/17/2015 
East Capital Explorer AB 11/9/2007 Nordax Group AB 6/17/2015 
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Duni AB 11/14/2007 Nobina AB 6/18/2015 
Malka Oil 11/20/2007 Pandox Ab 6/18/2015 
Erria A/S 11/8/2007 Europris ASA 6/19/2015 
Hafslund Infratek ASA 12/5/2007 Hugo Games A/S 6/26/2015 
Trifork A/S 12/20/2007 Capio AB 6/30/2015 
Aqua Bio Technology ASA 1/10/2008 FIT Biotech Oy 7/1/2015 
NattoPharma ASA 1/30/2008 Kotipizza Group Oyj 7/7/2015 
Thin Film Electronics ASA 1/30/2008 CLX Communications AB 10/8/2015 
Trygga Hem Skandinavien 
AB 
5/27/2008 Bravida Holding AB 10/16/2015 
Senzime AB 6/18/2008 Kid ASA 11/2/2015 
Spectrum ASA 7/4/2008 Skandiabanken ASA 11/2/2015 
Global Health Partner AB 10/3/2008 Waystream Holding AB 11/12/2015 
Cimber Sterling Group A/S 11/27/2009 Maxkompetens Sverige AB 11/23/2015 
North Energy ASA 2/5/2010 Dometic Group AB 11/25/2015 
Arise Windpower AB 3/24/2010 Attendo AB 11/30/2015 
Solvtrans Holding ASA 3/30/2010 A City Media AB 12/2/2015 
Jays AB 5/18/2010 Scandic Hotels Group AB 12/2/2015 
Bridge Energy ASA 5/21/2010 Evli Pankki Oyj 12/2/2015 
Byggmax Group AB 6/2/2010 Camurus AB 12/3/2015 
Chr Hansen Holding A/S 6/3/2010 Stillfront Group AB 12/8/2015 
MQ Holding AB 6/18/2010 Nilsson Special Vehicles 
AB 
12/11/2015 
Morpol ASA 6/30/2010 Consti Yhtiot Oy 12/11/2015 
Pallas Group AB 7/7/2010 Nuevolution AB 12/17/2015 
NetConnect ASA 7/12/2010 Scandinavian Tobacco 
Group A/S 
2/10/2016 
PANDORA A/S 10/5/2010 Garo AB 3/16/2016 
Cellcura ASA 10/6/2010 LeoVegas AB 3/17/2016 
Episurf Medical AB 11/5/2010 Humana AB 3/22/2016 
Zealand Pharma A/S 11/24/2010 Suomen Hoivatilat Oyj 3/31/2016 
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Vendator AB 11/30/2010 Nepa AB 4/26/2016 
Gjensidige Forsikring ASA 12/10/2010 Lehto Group Oyj 4/28/2016 
Kancera AB 2/25/2011 Resurs Holding AB 4/29/2016 
Norway Royal Salmon ASA 3/29/2011 Tokmanni Group Oy 4/29/2016 
Karolinska Development AB 4/15/2011 Paradox Interactive AB 5/31/2016 
Sevan Drilling ASA 5/3/2011 DONG Energy A/S 6/9/2016 
FinnvedenBulten AB 5/20/2011 Nordic Waterproofing Hldg 
A/S 
6/10/2016 
AroCell AB 5/25/2011 B3IT Management AB 6/16/2016 
Moberg Derma AB 5/26/2011 GomSpace Group AB 6/16/2016 
Transmode Holding AB 5/27/2011 Norwegian Finans Holding 
ASA 
6/17/2016 
 
 
